This paper examines whether foreign competition affects the reallocation of unpaid and family workers from household businesses to working outside of the family firm. Using a rich panel dataset of Vietnamese manufacturing enterprises that went through trade liberalization, I find that import competition leads to the switching of family and unpaid employees from working at the household firm to working externally. This response to heightening foreign competition is also greater for less financially stable firms, and for the households largely reliant on the income from the household firm. This finding is consistent with income diversification on the part of households who own firms threatened by import competition. We also explore heterogeneous effects among entering and exiting firms, as well as industry-switching firms.
Introduction
More than half of the 1.45 billion workers in the developing world are either self-employed or are unpaid family workers in a family firm (International Labour Organization 2014) . Given the substantial share of unpaid family labour in developing countries, a number of scholars have highlighted the importance of household labour as well as the factors that lead to more or fewer family workers in a firm (Barrett et al. 2001; Brookfield and Parsons 2007; Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1987; Reardon 1997 ). An important related research question is whether increases in foreign competition affect the utilization of family workers. This paper will show that in the face of foreign competition, less financially stable households adjust their labour supply decisions towards more family members working for wage employment in other firms. This is important to understand from a policy perspective as it has implications for how foreign competition may lead to more efficient resource allocation within households.
There are compelling reasons to believe that foreign competition might be important in explaining family labour supply decisions. On the one hand, the uncertainty created in the market by increasing foreign competition might lead to family workers remaining at the firm in order to help sustain the family business in the face of this competition. A key difficulty faced by small firms in the face of foreign competition is finding labour when the market wage is higher and family workers may be useful in filling this gap. This is consistent with the seminal trade model of Melitz (2003) , which predicted that trade liberalization will lead to low-productivity enterprises facing pressures as they cannot afford the labour costs. Having access to family workers can provide a mechanism through which such a firm could cope with increased competition. On the other hand, foreign competition might lead to family workers leaving the family firm in order to exploit higher wages that are available in the general economy, as well as to diversify household income given the greater uncertainty around the future of the household firm.
I investigate whether foreign competition affects household labour reallocation using a panel of around 3,000 household manufacturing firms from Vietnam over the period . Viet Nam offers a good example of a developing economy, which introduced a number of reforms and enterprise development laws since the 1980s. Viet Nam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, which led to the country becoming more exposed to the global market. I apply two measures of foreign competition: import penetration (similar to the measure used by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) ) and the actual level of imports. I use the variation within firms over time and find that when firms face greater foreign competition, they tend to employ fewer unpaid workers. 1 I then use within-household variation to find that the proportion of family labourers working at a household firm decreases as that firm faces foreign competition. I find that these results are stronger for less financially stable firms.
Previous studies that examined the relationship between family labour and trade liberalization primarily focused on the largely informal agricultural economy (e.g. Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006) . This paper's contribution is the provision of a better understanding of the effect of full market trade liberalization on the reallocation of family labour for formal and informal enterprises. The closest papers to this research are two papers by Pavcnik (2014, 2017) , which examined the effect of a positive export shock in Viet Nam on the allocation of household labour. 2 McCaig and Pavcnik (2017) found that an increase in export market opportunities led to a reallocation of 5 per cent of manufacturing workers from informal firms (primarily household businesses) to employers in the formal enterprise sector. McCaig and Pavcnik (2014) showed that household businesses in industries with greater tariff cuts expanded their revenues and were more likely to hire non-family members as workers.
My results are consistent with the findings of Pavcnik (2014, 2017) . This paper builds on the work of these authors by examining the mechanisms in play as well as linking the results of these two papers. I identify the number of family, non-family, paid, and unpaid workers employed at each firm over time and thus can explore the dynamics of hiring inside and outside labour. I present the mechanism that import competition leads household members to leave family firms in order to diversify the income source of the households. The implications of this mechanism are supported when I account for heterogeneity of firms in the sample. In particular, the effect of household workers leaving family firms is greater for poorer firms as well as for firms that provide the primary income source for their household even when controlling for the market wage. This paper is also related to the literature that investigates the impacts of trade liberalization on firm dynamics and, in particular, on labour allocation. A large body of research examining the impact of trade liberalization in developing countries focuses on wage changes (Attanasio et al. 2004; Borjas and Ramey 1995; Feliciano 2001) . For example, Fukase (2013) used the USA-Viet Nam Bilateral Trade Agreement to show that the provinces that were more exposed to export expansion experienced higher unskilled labour wage growth and much smaller growth in the relative wages of skilled labour compared to other provinces. Other papers in the literature explored the effects of trade policies on hiring patterns and the welfare of workers (Autor et al. 2014; Caliendo et al. 2015; Dix-Carneiro 2014; Krishna and Senses 2014) . Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) used employer-employee linked data from Brazil to examine the effect of tariff cuts on labour allocation. The paper found that trade liberalization leads to worker displacement and fewer hirings. Autor et al. (2013) examined the case of US imports from China with the identification strategy exploiting regional variation in industrial specialization. They found that import competition from China explains one-quarter of the decline in US employment in manufacturing. 3 The paper proceeds as follows. The case of Viet Nam and the potential mechanisms by which foreign competition can affect family labour are described in Section 2. The data are then presented in Section 3, while Section 4 describes the empirical strategy. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 discuss the empirical results and Section 6 provides the robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2
Background and mechanisms
Background
Viet Nam is a prominent example of a fast-growing Asian economy. This country has experienced rapid economic growth since the late 1980s, as it moved from a centrally planned to a socialist-oriented market economy. The transition happened through a number of economic and political reforms called the 'Doi Moi' reforms. Viet Nam applied for accession to the WTO in 1995, and since then the country has gone through several legal reforms and programmes mandated as part of the negotiations. These reforms resulted in Viet Nam becoming the 150th WTO member on 11 January 2007. This accession accelerated Vietnamese trade liberalization and increased competitive pressure on the domestic sector. While the domestic sector experienced intense international competition, studies have found that WTO accession had an overall positive effect on the economy of Viet Nam (Abbott and Tarp 2011) .
As Viet Nam grew, the number of Vietnamese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) also increased substantially. The growth rate of SMEs was especially high after the Vietnam Enterprise Law of 1999 was implemented. As of 2012, SMEs constituted 97.7 per cent of all firms and employed 46.8 per cent of the Vietnamese labour force (Asian Development Bank 2015) . The manufacturing sector employed 14.1 per cent of the total population in 2014. Cling et al. (2011) estimated that there are 10.3 million household firms operating in Viet Nam, with around 82 per cent of these being informal household businesses. According to their estimates, the majority of workers in the Vietnamese informal economy are either self-employed or family workers. For instance, in Hanoi's manufacturing industry, unpaid workers account for 23.4 per cent of the total labour force and in Ho Chi Minh City this figure is 21.7 per cent.
The effect of WTO accession is arguably an exogenous shock for household firms in Viet Nam (e.g. Baccini et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2013) . First, Viet Nam had low bargaining power during the tariff reduction discussion with the WTO. Second, household enterprises do not export or import goods. For example, under 1 per cent of household firms in the sample used in this research sold goods for direct export or to foreign-invested companies. The majority of these enterprises exclusively sold goods to the domestic market. 4 Household firms were mostly affected by the international trade through competition in the market for their final goods.
Mechanisms
There is a large literature that examines how households react to shocks and whether they diversify income in response to these shocks. The drivers of income diversification are characterized as 'push' and 'pull' factors (Barrett et al. 2001; Ellis 2000; Haggblade et al. 2007; Reardon 1997) . Push factors relate to external events that cause income fluctuations in households (e.g. drought, rainfall instability, diseases) and lead them to adopt income diversification strategies to mitigate negative income shocks. Pull factors refer to opportunities (e.g. higher payoffs, lower risk) in terms of household incomes. Trade liberalization of a country provides opportunities for export (a pull factor) as well as increases the level of imports (a push factor). It is unlikely, however, that export opportunities emerged for small household firms in the short run. The adverse impact of increased imports is likely to outweigh any potential export opportunities for these firms.
The effect of the liberalization of trade on worker allocation has been examined in several studies. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) showed that import penetration led to worker displacements in Brazil. Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) performed a study of 25 trade liberalization episodes and showed a weakly negative effect of trade liberalization on the extent of inter-sectoral labour reallocation. McCaig and Pavcnik (2017) found that workers were reallocated from household firms to larger enterprises in response to a positive export shock in Viet Nam.
Recent literature has established the heterogeneous effects of trade liberalization on firm outcomes within an industry. Trade liberalization leads to export market entry and expansion for highly productive firms, which in turn leads to further improvements in the aggregate productivity of the industry (Melitz 2003) . Thus, trade liberalization is likely to present opportunities for larger, more productive Vietnamese firms to expand and to export. These firms could also be adversely affected by higher wages in the labour market, which could counteract any gains from access to exporting. At the same time, low-productivity firms will exit the market due to rising labour costs. Furthermore, trade liberalization will lead to a reallocation from less productive firms towards more productive firms. Thus, consistent with Melitz (2003) , trade liberalization in Viet Nam should have led to a decline in employment in less productive firms (which are likely to be household enterprises) and a rise in employment in betterperforming enterprises. Smaller, less productive Vietnamese firms will not generally be able to enter the export market but will face greater competition in their product market from imports and higher costs in the labour market (consistent with the mechanism of McCaig and Pavcnik (2014)). This increased competition for workers in the labour market and competition for buyers in the product market may have implications for labour supply decisions of the household firms.
Firms facing heavy competition and rising market wages may be less likely to survive in the long term.
There are a number of ways in which household firms could adjust their family and network labour in response to this possibility. The first mechanism is income diversification. Household workers may decide to leave the firm in order to diversify household income due to increased uncertainty about the future. This effect is likely to be accentuated if the opening up of trade boosts wages available at other firms. On the other hand, the effect of international trade on household labour might be the oppositeincreased international trade may lead to more household workers joining their family firms in order to help firms survive. A third possible impact of international trade on household labour is that increased wages might attract previously non-working family members to join the labour force. In the subsequent sections of this paper, these mechanisms will be examined.
Data
I use five waves of the Small and Medium Enterprise Survey collected in Viet Nam between 2005 and 2013 at biannual frequency. The survey was gathered by the Vietnamese General Statistics Office. 5 Each wave contains information on about 2,500 enterprises operating in the manufacturing sector across 10 provinces in Viet Nam. As the focus of this paper is on the household response to foreign competition, the analysis is restricted to household-owned firms. The final sample consists of around 1,800 firms operating in each wave. 6 Each enterprise in the survey was asked to report the industry of operation based on the four-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code system. I matched these industry codes with import and export data for Viet Nam from the World Integrated Trade Solution database (World Bank 2017). I then augmented the dataset with the revenue for four-digit ISIC industries using the Enterprise Census data. All trade and revenue values were then deflated with the annual consumer price index.
I first explore the time patterns of the key variables in Table 1 . As expected, imports and exports grew substantially after WTO accession in 2007. Consistent with Vietnamese macroeconomic data, 7 the household firms in the SME dataset shrank in size after WTO accession. These household firms also reduced the number of paid and unpaid workers. The share of unpaid labour in firms (unpaid labour share) 8 increased throughout the years, which reflects the fact that firms were losing paid workers at a higher rate than unpaid employees. 9 The SME questionnaire asked each firm representative (either owner or manager) the number of family members that work for the firm, were employed at another firm for a wage at both full-time and part-time levels, or were self-employed. The last four variables in Table 1 present the participation of those family members in the labour force. The average number of household members working for the household firm declined from 2.12 to 1.98, while employment outside of the firm increased substantially from 0.73 to 1.03 throughout the years. The ratio of family workers employed at the firm to family workers employed elsewhere, which I will call the HHW ratio, 10 largely increased after WTO accession. This pattern can also be observed in Figure 1 , where I limit the sample to owner families only and separate it by part-time and full-time employment. Figure 1 presents the composition of family labour working for the household firm and employed somewhere else (either at other firms or are self-employed). Prior to trade liberalization (waves 2005 and 2007) , 74 per cent of household members worked at a family firm; however, this share dropped to about 64 per cent after Viet Nam joined the WTO. The share of full-time employment at the firm declined from 70 per cent to 57 per cent, while the share of part-time workers at firms elsewhere increased from 2 per cent to 12 per cent between 2005 and 2013. Given these fluctuations, it is likely that some family members reallocated from full-time to part-time jobs at the firm, while at the same time some household members that used to be inactive joined the family business.
The descriptive statistics show that the firms in the sample had different labour compositions before and after WTO accession. Thus, in other (generally larger) firms in the survey to estimate external wages. I predict external wage based on province, sector, and year. Note, in the main analysis I do not use the sample that I used to predict wages, in order to avoid double-use of the data. Consistent with the literature (Feliciano 2001; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) , external wages increased after trade liberalization. The labour fired to hired ratio rose, 11 which indicates that after 2007 firms were losing more workers than they were hiring. The enterprises that hired labour experienced more difficulties with finding workers after trade liberalization, which could be due to better employment opportunities available in non-household firms (McCaig and Pavcnik 2017) . Finally, the financial performance of firms appeared to improve slightly. 11 I define this measure as the difference between fired and hired regular labour over total regular labour. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics by sector in order to explore heterogeneity between industries. I follow the standard ISIC classification and group the data into eight unique categories. The two sectors with the lowest self-reported competition 12 (manufacturers of food products, 33.5 per cent of enterprises, and producers of wood, paper, and publishing, 16.4 per cent of firms) had the lowest ratio of family workers leaving the household firm and the highest unpaid labour share. The two sectors with the largest self-reported competition (manufacturers of metals, 20.6 per cent of firms, and producers of machinery and other equipment, 10.1 per cent of firms), had the lowest unpaid labour share and the highest ratio of household workers. This suggests a positive link between competition and the ratio of household members leaving the firm, as well as a negative relationship between competition and share of unpaid workers at these firms.
Firms that enter or exit the market, as well as firms that switch industries, might cope differently to other firms with foreign competition. For example, Newman et al. (2013) used a sample of Vietnamese manufacturing firms and found that firm switchers tend to show different behaviours and have distinct characteristics compared to firms that exit and enter the market. In particular, the authors found a positive relationship between trade liberalization and switching behaviour. Table A2 in the Appendix explores these possible differences using t-tests for the firms that entered, exited the market, and switched industry. 13 This table shows that firm switchers and non-switchers are not statistically significantly different in means for the majority of labour characteristics. The firms that switched industry hired fewer workers, experienced more difficulties with finding workers (likely due to an adjustment to a new industry), and had a higher ratio of household members leaving the firm compared to the firms that stayed in the industry. Firms that left the market (panel C in Table A2 ) had lower shares of unpaid and family workers compared to surviving firms. They did not fire labour more than survivors; the workers were voluntarily leaving the firm at a much higher rate compared to surviving enterprises.
This section showed that imports and exports have a negative relationship with the share of family labour employed at the firm. Self-reported competition has a negative relationship with the share of unpaid labour employed at the firm. It also provides evidence that there was a change in the majority of firm characteristics after trade liberalization. Furthermore, there is also the potential for heterogeneous effects for firms, depending on whether they are industry switchers, exiters, or entrants into the market.
Empirical strategy
This paper uses an unbalanced sample of manufacturing firms in Viet Nam and follows two approaches to examine the effect of foreign competition on the allocation of network and family workers. The first approach examines the composition of family and network workers in a firm's labour force using the sample of unpaid workers. The second approach uses a subsample of firm owners and focuses on the allocation of family workers inside and outside of their firm.
4.1

Unpaid labour at firms
Household firms can readjust their family and unpaid labour in response to foreign competition in several ways, as discussed in Section 2.2. Workers might leave the firm in order to diversify income or to obtain higher wages; they can also remain at the firm in order to help it cope with the increased competition. The aim of the analysis is to explore the impact of foreign competition on the unpaid labour in the firm using the empirical specification in Equation 1. I use unpaid workers as a proxy for family and network labour employed at the firm. 14 The identification strategy depends on the changes in unpaid labour utilization among firms that operate in industries facing different levels of foreign competition.
Unpaid labour share ipst = α i + β 1 Penetration st + β 2 Log external wage pst
where unpaid labour share ipst measures the proportion of unpaid workers among all workers in firm i that operates in industry s in province p at time t, defined as:
where unpaid workers ipst is the total number of unpaid workers that work either full-time or part-time and total labour ipst is the total number of workers that are employed at the firm either full-time or parttime.
The main measure of foreign competition used in this paper is the import penetration of the Vietnamese manufacturing sector at the four-digit ISIC level s at time t denoted by penetration st . This measures the share of the domestic market demand for a particular good that is satisfied by imports. I define it as a logarithm of imports divided by domestic industry revenue (see Equation 3 ). A negative coefficient will imply that an increase in foreign competition is associated with fewer unpaid workers staying at the firm. My measure is similar to the measure used by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) , who defined import penetration as the logarithm of imports over home sales. 15 I also use the logarithm of imports, log imports st , to Viet Nam at the four-digit industry level as an alternative measure of foreign competition. I additionally include the logarithm of exports, log exports st , from Viet Nam to other countries.
Penetration st = Log Imports st Industry revenues st + 1
I also control for the external wage in the economy in order to control whether unpaid workers leave for better wages in other firms, log external wage pst . Larger firms and firms that export are more likely to offer higher wages (Attanasio et al. 2004; Borjas and Ramey 1995; Fukase 2013) . For example, Macis and Schivardi (2016) showed that exporters pay a higher wage premium compared to other firms.
The vector Υ includes time-variant basic firm characteristics. First, I use an indicator of self-reported competition. This is 0 if a firm experiences no competition and 1 if a firm reported at least a 'low level' of competition. 16 This is used both to account for the level of competition perceived by the firm 14 See footnote 1 for the justification. 15 In place of home sales, I use sectoral revenues. Given that sectoral revenues might contain some export values, I test for the robustness of the results in Section 6. I replace the denominator of penetration with total industry revenues -exports. and as a robustness check. A recent paper by Nguyen and Nordman (2017) investigated differences in productivity for firms with family and hired labour using a sample of Vietnamese household firms. They found that the labour productivity gap for informal firms is around 35 per cent. Also, informal firms are less likely to use formal employment methods (i.e. hiring through government programmes) and thus might need to rely on family and network labour. I thus use an indicator of whether the enterprise has a tax code number, which acts as a proxy for whether the firm is formal.
I also include the logarithm of firm revenues to control for firm size. Longer-established firms might use different hiring techniques, refined over the years; thus I include the age of the firm in the specification. Unpaid labour is most likely to consist of family and relatives, which might be hired if the enterprise cannot find labour. I use an indicator for whether firms hired labour and whether they experienced difficulties in finding labour. Firms that rely heavily on manual work are more dependent on labour than firms that use machinery and can replace workers with it. I thus control for the level of technological advancement the firm has. I also include an indicator of whether the firm is an exporter. Vietnamese firms reported that finding an appropriate location for business is an issue partially because of poor infrastructure (Carlier and Tran 2004) . The quality of infrastructure can correlate with the performance of an enterprise and influence the labour composition. I account for it by using an indicator for whether an enterprise has access to a road or a rail network.
The existing empirical literature established the importance of education in selection into entrepreneurship and performance (see van der Sluis et al. (2005) for the review of studies). In particular, bettereducated workers are more likely to work in wage employment and prefer non-farm entrepreneurship to farming. I control for the level of basic education of the survey respondent. A larger business network implies that firms can find workers more easily and this can influence the decision to select a particular level of unpaid labour. I account for the social capital using the logarithm of the self-reported number of contacts inside and outside of the main line of business. Finally, I control for the position of the respondent (either manager or owner).
The terms α i represent firm fixed effects, γ s account for differences in unpaid labour allocation between industries with industry indicator variables, and θ t controls for the time component. ϑ p is the set of dummies for provinces and ipst is the statistical error term. I cluster standard errors at the three-digit industry level in order to take into account within-industry autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
While Vietnamese trade liberalization is considered as an exogenous shock, 17 there are still potential confounders that could affect both the import competition and labour allocation (e.g. regulations that affect the growth of trade and labour demand, FDI could lead to more job creation and better international trade performance). To minimize the impact of endogeneity, I use firm fixed effects, time, province, and industry indicators, as well as an extensive set of controls. Another concern is that provinces can be disproportionately affected over time through both increased imports and increased hirings of outside labour. I account for this endogeneity concern by using a specification that includes province and time interactions in the robustness section.
Household labour at firms
The second approach restricts the sample to business owners and examines the effect of foreign competition on family labour responses. This identification strategy relies on exploiting variation in withinhousehold employment choices in family firms, as the industries they operate in are exposed to different 17 See the discussion in Section 2. levels of foreign competition. The following specification is used:
HHW ratio j pst = λ j + β 1 Penetration st + β 2 Log external wage pst
where the dependent variable, HHW ratio j pst , measures the rate at which household workers leave the firm for other full-or part-time employment, and it is defined as:
HHW ratio j pst = HHM not working at firm j pst HHM working at firm j pst (5) where HHM working at firm j pst is the number of family members that are employed at the firm either full-time or part-time. HHM not working at firm j pst is the total number of family members that work either full-time or part-time elsewhere, or are self-employed outside of the household firm.
I use the same penetration measure as described earlier. A negative coefficient of penetration implies that an increase in foreign competition is associated with more family labour workers staying at the firm. I also use the same firm controls as described in section 4.1. The decision to use a particular level of family labour also depends on family size and composition, and I control for this with an additional vector of controls, Ω j pst . These controls are the number of household members by age group: less than 15 years old, between 15 and 60 years old, and over 60 years old. A larger family size might indicate more support from the family and more involvement in the family business. Baines and Wheelock (1998) used data from the UK and found that for more than 50 per cent of a sample in which the owner lived with a spouse, spouses were highly involved in the business in the form of co-ownership and paid or unpaid labour. At the same time, having more dependants in the family also suggests that households are subject to more risk than households with fewer dependants. Brand-Weiner and Francavilla (2015) showed that Vietnamese households with many dependants had low income mobility.
The terms λ j , γ s , and θ t represent the respondent fixed effects as well as industry and time indicator variables, respectively. ϑ p controls for provinces and u j pst is the statistical error term. I again cluster standard errors at the three-digit industry level to account for within-industry autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
I try to minimize the effect of endogenous factors that could affect both the level of foreign competition and the household firm labour composition by using household fixed effects, time, province, industry indicators, and a set of controls. I also use province-time interactions in the robustness section to account for the possibility of endogeneity at time and province levels.
Results
This section presents the results of estimating Equation 1 using the unbalanced sample of firms in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2 I restrict the unbalanced sample to firm owners and report the results of estimating Equation 4. I also test for heterogeneous effects of foreign competition, depending on the level of firm and household financial security.
Firm-level analysis
I examine the effect of foreign competition using the penetration measure (defined in Equation 3) on the share of unpaid labour at firms in Table 4 . This shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient of penetration, which indicates that as import competition increases the firm tends to retain a smaller proportion of unpaid labour. 18 I introduce the logarithm of the external wage in column (2) and add firm control variables in column (3). The coefficient of wage is negative, which suggests that higher wages available at other firms play a significant role in unpaid workers leaving the enterprise. 19 These results remain consistent when the logarithm of imports is used as an alternative foreign competition measure in Table 5 . 20 The logarithm of exports (a 'pull' factor) is also controlled for. The negative coefficients for the logarithm of imports suggest that increases in import competition are associated with lower unpaid labour at firms. The increase in exports, which indicates an increase in opportunities in the industry for workers, leads to firms employing a higher share of unpaid workers. Together, the results of Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with an income diversification argument: as household firms face greater competition, more unpaid workers leave the firm to seek outside employment. 18 When the external wage is excluded from the regressions, the results remain robust. 19 A concern can be raised that this specification does not take into account factors that vary by province and time and can potentially affect the results. In order to account for the possibility that some provinces can be disproportionately affected over time, I use the specification with the combined province and time dummies in the robustness section. 20 When the external wage is excluded from the regressions, the results remain robust. The income diversification mechanism implies that less financially stable firms would also exhibit a greater shift in response to foreign competition. This could be because these households have less wealth and are more sensitive to income changes than more financially stable firms. There may also be less incentive for family members to engage in unpaid work to bolster a lower-earning firm. I, therefore, replicate the empirical specification 1 for the samples below and above median profits, revenues, and financial assets (Table 6) . 21 The firms with profit, revenues, and financial assets below the median exhibit larger coefficients and show a statistically significant response to penetration. The result for penetration is also statistically significant for the sample above median profit. However, the coefficient is about 20 times lower compared to the results for the sample below the median profit.
Overall, the findings of this section are consistent with the income diversification hypothesis. I next test whether this result holds in specification focused on family workers leaving the firm at the household level rather than unpaid labour at the firm level. 
Household-level analysis
This section tests whether an increase in foreign competition affects the ratio of household members leaving the household firm for other wage employment. I limit the sample to business owners' responses, so I can explore the internal variation within a household over time. Table 7 presents the results that rely on the empirical specification defined in Equation 4. 22 Positive and statistically significant coefficients for penetration across all specifications suggest that as foreign competition increases, family workers leave the firm for other employment. These results further show that the external wage available in other industries is an important factor in the decision to leave the firm.
If the income diversification mechanism is present, then the effect of heightening foreign competition would be more pronounced in households that highly depend on the firm as their main income source. Thus, I interact penetration with the categories representing the number of income-generation jobs a household has. The baseline category is one income-generating job in a household. The results are available in the last column of Table 7 . The effect of penetration is still statistically significant. As the household has more income-generating jobs, the effect of foreign competition is lower. This suggests that the results of the paper are mainly driven by less financially stable households.
This section further confirmed that the results are consistent with the income diversification mechanism, where household members leave the firm to find a job elsewhere as foreign competition increases. 
Robustness
To check robustness, I first use different penetration measures (the results are in Table 8 ). Penetration (1) follows the method used by Nickell (1996) and is the ratio of imports over domestic sales. The second measure, Penetration (2), is similar to that utilized by Konings et al. (2005) . This is the share of imports over total imports and domestic sales. Finally, Penetration (3) is the logarithm of the share of imports over the difference between domestic sales and exports. This measure is similar to the main penetration measure used in this paper. However, given that I use sectoral revenues as a proxy for domestic sales, these might contain some revenues from exports. Therefore, in Penetration (3), I subtract the exports from the industry-level revenues. The results in Table 8 are consistent with the findings presented in the previous section for both measures of family and network labour across all specifications.
I further replace the unpaid labour share with a ratio of unpaid over paid labour in Table 9 . This measures the replacement ratio of unpaid workers with paid employees. The results imply that increases in foreign competition are associated with less unpaid labour remaining at the firm compared to paid employees. Previous studies have found that severe competition might drive firms out of their main business activity and make them choose to produce different products (e.g. Newman et al. (2013) for Viet Nam). If a firm decided to switch industry, then it might be a logical time to adjust staffing. The model of Melitz (2003) predicted that unproductive firms exit the market in response to trade liberalization. The firms that exit might have a different family hiring composition compared to the firms that survived. I explore whether the firms that exit, enter the market, and switch industry had different family-hiring approaches in response to foreign competition. I therefore interact in Table 10 both measures of foreign competition with an indicator variable for whether the firm entered the market, exited the market, or switched industry since the previous wave. The coefficients for penetration and imports exhibit a negative sign and are statistically significant, as in the previous section; however, the interaction terms for exit, entry, and switching are not statistically significant. This suggests that competition drives changes in labour utilization, independent of switching, entry, or exit. The robustness of the results to the balanced sample is then tested in Table 11 . I use the empirical specifications 1 and 4. All of the results remain robust. Finally, I examine whether the potential for endogeneity at the provincial and time levels potentially bias the results. Viet Nam's growth and WTO accession could have attracted more imports, exports, and foreign direct investment (FDI) into particular provinces. At the same time, household members of the firms operating in these expanding provinces could have left the family firm. The external wage may not be able to perfectly control for the change in the opportunities available at other firms in this case. To avert this, I use combined time and province dummies to control for the factors that vary at both time and province levels in Table 12 . Although the magnitude of coefficients declined slightly, the results are consistent with the previous section highlighting that household and network labour leaves the firm in response to foreign competition. 
Conclusion
Household businesses employ a significant proportion of the labour force in developing countries, and as such the reallocation of workers from unpaid labour roles in household firms to other roles is important to understand. As a result, the impact of international trade on the performance of firms in developing countries and the related employment outcomes has been an area of intense research (Hoekman 2005; Pavcnik 2014, 2017; Menezes-Filho and Muendler 2011) .
This paper contributes to this literature and is focused on the impact of import competition for household firms on the labour supply decisions of these households. A large panel dataset of household manufacturing firms operating in Viet Nam was used to identify these relationships. In this analysis, I found that unpaid labour at household firms is more likely to leave the firm as the level of foreign competition in the industry increases. The results are mainly driven by less financially stable firms. The results are reduced but still statistically significant when external wages are controlled for. The findings are consistent with an income diversification mechanism on the part of households: family workers leave family firms to diversify the household's income source away from the household firm as a result of increased uncertainty about the firm's future. The empirical results are robust to a number of alternate specifications. Notes: Significance is denoted by: * 10 per cent level, ** 5 per cent level, *** 1 per cent level.
Source: author's calculations based on Vietnamese Small and Medium Enterprise Surveys.
